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ABSTRACT
According to embodied and grounded theories, concepts are grounded in sensorimotor
systems. Themajority of evidence supporting these views concerns concepts referring to
objects or actions, while evidence on abstract concepts is more scarce. Explaining how
abstract concepts such as ‘‘freedom’’ are representedwould thus be pivotal for grounded
theories. According to some recent proposals, abstract concepts are grounded in both
sensorimotor and linguistic experience, thus they activate the mouth motor system
more than concrete concepts. Two experiments are reported, aimed at verifyingwhether
abstract, concrete and emotional words activate the mouth and the hand effectors. In
both experiments participants performed first a lexical decision, then a recognition task.
In Experiment 1 participants responded by pressing a button either with the mouth or
with the hand, in Experiment 2 responses were given with the foot, while a button
held either in the mouth or in the hand was used to respond to catch-trials. Abstract
words were slower to process in both tasks (concreteness effect). Across the tasks and
experiments, emotional concepts had instead a fluctuating pattern, different from those
of both concrete and abstract concepts, suggesting that they cannot be considered as a
subset of abstract concepts. The interaction between type of concept (abstract, concrete
and emotional) and effector (mouth, hand) was not significant in the lexical decision
task, likely because it emerged only with tasks implying a deeper processing level. It
reached significance, instead, in the recognition tasks. In both experiments abstract
concepts were facilitated in the mouth condition compared to the hand condition,
supporting our main prediction. Emotional concepts instead had a more variable
pattern. Overall, our findings indicate that various kinds of concepts differently activate
the mouth and hand effectors, but they also suggest that concepts activate effectors in
a flexible and task-dependent way.
Subjects Psychiatry and Psychology
Keywords Type of concepts, Embodied and grounded cognition, Language processing,
Abstract concepts
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INTRODUCTION
When we process and recognize words, do we activate the body? Do different kinds of
words, as abstract, concrete and emotional words, activate different effectors, such as the
mouth and the hand? Is this eventual activation modulated by the task?
The past years have seen the spread of embodied and grounded (from now on grounded)
theories of cognition (Barsalou, 2008; Barsalou, 2010; Barsalou, 2016; Glenberg, 2015;
Glenberg, Witt & Metcalfe, 2013; Borghi & Caruana, 2015), according to which concepts
and words activate our bodily interactions with the world. Compelling evidence has
demonstrated that when we hear words as for example ‘ball’ we re-enact previous
interactions with the word referent, activating the sensorimotor system. This has been
clearly demonstrated for words that refer to object or actions (Cappa & Pulvermüller, 2012;
Glenberg & Gallese, 2012). While it is now established that concrete words are grounded in
perception and action systems, the game is still open for abstract concepts and the words
that express them, such as ‘‘fantasy’’ and ‘‘beauty’’.
Explaining how not only concrete but also abstract concepts are grounded in the
sensorimotor system represents a major challenge for embodied and grounded views,
as recent debates testify (for recent reviews, see Borghi et al., 2017; Pecher, Boot & Van
Dantzig, 2011; Wang et al., 2017; for special topics see Tomasino & Rumiati, 2013; Dove,
2015;Mahon & Hickok, 2016; Bolognesi & Steen, in press; Borghi et al., 2018a).
Compared to concrete words, abstract words typically lack a single object as referent, and
refer to complex events and situations; furthermore, they are more detached from the five
sensorial modalities, and are represented in a more variable way both across participants
and within the same participant. Finally, according to recent proposals they are generally
more grounded in internal states (interoception, metacognition, proprioception) Barsalou,
2003; Barsalou, Dutriaux & Scheepers, 2018; Borghi et al., 2018b; Borghi & Binkofski, 2014;
Connell, Lynott & Banks, 2018; Kousta et al., 2011).
Two major novelties characterize recent literature on abstract concepts.
The first novelty is represented by the recognition that abstract concepts are not a
monolithic whole, but that there might exist sub-kinds of abstract concepts that are
differently represented. Recent studies have started to explore the differences between
abstract concepts such as mathematic ones, emotional ones, mental states ones, social
concepts, temporal concepts (e.g., Setti & Caramelli, 2005; Ghio, Vaghi & Tettamanti,
2013; Roversi, Borghi & Tummolini, 2013; Crutch et al., 2013;Mellem et al., 2016; C Villani,
L Lugli, MT Liuzza, AM Borghi, 2018, unpublished data; Borghi et al., 2018b; Desai, Reilly
& Van Dam, 2018). In this framework, it is debated whether emotions are to be considered
as a sub-kind of abstract concepts or whether they differ from both concrete and abstract
ones (for discussion see Mazzuca, Barca & Borghi, 2017; Barca, Mazzuca & Borghi, 2017).
Altarriba, Bauer & Benvenuto (1999) and Altarriba & Bauer (2004) demonstrated that
emotional concepts differ from concrete and abstract ones in ratings on a variety of
psycholinguistics criteria, such as concreteness, imageability, and contextual availability,
that they elicit different word associations, and that in free recall they are recalled better than
concrete and abstract concepts. These authors have even argued that including emotional
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concepts among abstract concepts can lead to biased results (Altarriba, Bauer & Benvenuto,
1999).
For this reason, in the present work we did not include emotional concepts within
abstract ones. Rather, we considered abstract, concrete and emotional concepts separately,
in order to verify whether emotional concepts were responded tomore similarly to concrete
or to abstract concepts. We compared the processing of these three kinds of concepts in
a lexical decision and in a subsequent word recognition task, measuring response times
and accuracy. To investigate whether these concepts differently activate the hand/mouth
effectors, in Experiment 1 participants were required to produce a response pressing a
key either with the hand or with the mouth. In Experiment 2 participants were instead
requested to respond using a pedal but had to keep a device either in their hand or mouth
to respond to catch-trials. The first aim of the present study thus consists in comparing
the processing of abstract, concrete and emotional concepts using response modalities that
involve different effectors, i.e., the hand or the mouth, and two different tasks, a lexical
decision task and a subsequent recognition task. Our intent is to verify whether abstract,
concrete and emotional concepts are differently grounded in the sensorimotor system, and
whether they differently activate the hand and mouth effectors.
The second novelty in current literature on abstract concepts is the emergence ofmultiple
representation views (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Cuccio & Gallese, 2018; Dove, 2009; Dove,
2011; Dreyer & Pulvermüller, 2018; Kousta et al., 2011; Newcombe et al., 2012; Prinz, 2012;
Recchia & Jones, 2012). These views represent an extension of grounded ones. They contend
that, in order to fully account for abstract concepts representation, likely the linguistic,
social, and emotional systems are activated beyond the perception and action systems.
Within multiple representation views, some proposals highlight the importance of
language for abstract concepts representation. In particular,Dove (2014) has proposed that
language is useful to improve our thought and our problem solving abilities (see alsoClark,
1998; Lupyan & Clark, 2015; Dove, 2018). More relevant to the present work, the WAT
(Words As social Tools) view (Borghi et al., 2018b; Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Borghi et al.,
2011; Borghi & Cimatti, 2009; Borghi & Zarcone, 2016) proposes that words are tools useful
to operate in the physical and social environment. Specifically, abstract words would evoke
linguistic and social experience more than other words. Abstract concepts are composed
by sparse and heterogeneous exemplars, and linguistic labels would facilitate us in keeping
these different exemplars together in a single category. Consistently with this perspective,
literature on Modality of Acquisition (MoA) (Wauters, 2003) has shown that words
acquired through the linguistic modality are more abstract and acquired later than words
acquired through the perceptual modality, i.e., pointing to their referent (see also Thill &
Twomey, 2016).
Studies by Topolinski and collaborators (Topolinski & Strack, 2009; Topolinski et al.,
2014) have shown that during word reading we activate a simulation of the phono-
articulatory aspects of words. According toWAT the phenomenon of covertly pronouncing
words during reading is more pronounced when processing abstract words than concrete
words. Of particular relevance for our hypothesis, previous findings suggest that abstract
words elicit strong activations of brain areas linked with phonological processes and verbal
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short-termmemory (Binder et al., 2005), and also a specific involvement of facemotor areas
in the processing of abstract mental nouns was observed (Dreyer & Pulvermüller, 2018).
Recent lesion data are challenging the idea that these activations are just an epiphenomenal
byproduct of the act of reading, supporting the idea that the motor system plays a causal
role in the process of comprehending some kind of abstract-emotional words (Dreyer
et al., 2015).
WAT proposes that themouthmotor system activation during abstract words processing
is due to different mechanisms (see for extensive discussion Borghi et al., 2018b): the re-
enactment of the linguistic experience associated to abstract concepts acquisition, the use
of inner talk to re-explain to ourselves the word meaning, or a mechanism of ‘‘social
metacognition’’, consisting in the inner awareness of the inadequacy of our concepts, and
in the need to ask others to help us. The simulation of word meaning would therefore play
a substantial role for comprehension and not be simply a byproduct of word reading.
In sum: in line with the WAT view we contend that linguistic experience is particularly
relevant for abstract concepts, because owing to their complexity and to the heterogeneity
of their members they are difficult to acquire without the contribution of others. Because
of such relevance of the linguistic experience, we hypothesize that during processing of
abstract words the mouth motor system is involved, and thus that oral simulations are
particularly crucial in the case of abstract words.
The second andmore important aim of our study is to test the hypothesis that processing
different kinds of words differently involves the mouth and the hand effectors. More
specifically, we predict that the mouth motor system is more engaged for abstract than for
concrete words, due to the fact that abstract concepts activate more linguistic experience.
Consistently, previous evidence has shown that abstract words are rated as involving the
mouth more than concrete words (Granito, Scorolli & Borghi, 2015), and that abstract
sentences referring to mental states and to emotions are rated as involving the mouth more
than math-related abstract sentences (Ghio, Vaghi & Tettamanti, 2013). Furthermore,
behavioral evidence with response times has demonstrated that responses with the mouth
were facilitated with abstract compared to concrete concepts in a definition-word-matching
task (Borghi & Zarcone, 2016), and recent fMRI evidence has shown that abstract mental
concepts evoke the mouth motor system (Dreyer & Pulvermüller, 2018).
We intend here to investigate whether the facilitation of mouth responses with abstract
concepts, previously found in semantic tasks (e.g., Borghi et al., 2011; Granito, Scorolli
& Borghi, 2015; Borghi & Zarcone, 2016), is present also in lexical decision task, and to
verify whether it affects recognition. It is well known that in many cases semantic access is
guaranteed by lexical decision tasks, but the processing level of lexical decision is shallower
than that of semantic tasks (e.g., Barsalou, 2008). Notably, in fact, previous evidence
on activation of effectors with verbs was obtained not only with sentences or verbs in
evaluation tasks (e.g., Buccino et al., 2005), but also with passive reading tasks (e.g., Hauk,
Johnsrude & Pulvermüller, 2004; Dreyer & Pulvermüller, 2018).
To investigate the involvement of the mouth effector in the processing of abstract words
compared to concrete and emotional ones, we performed two different experiments. In
Experiment 1 participants responded by pressing a button with the hand or with themouth,
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in Experiment 2 they kept a button in the hand or in the mouth to respond to catch-trials,
but responses to critical trials were given by pressing a pedal with the foot.
EXPERIMENT 1
Previous results in which participants were required to decide whether a definitionmatched
with a target words revealed that the processing of abstract concepts was facilitated with
mouth responses, while the processing of concrete ones with manual responses (Borghi
& Zarcone, 2016). In Experiment 1 we used the same response modality and the same
response devices adopted by Borghi and Zarcone. We intended to verify whether the
facilitation of abstract over concrete concepts in responses with the mouth was also present
in a task involving a more superficial processing level, i.e., a lexical decision task, and in
a subsequent recognition task. As to emotional words, we were interested in investigating
whether they were processed similarly to other abstract words or whether they differed
from both concrete and abstract words.
Method
Participants
Forty native Italian speakers in a range of age between 20–30 years (22 females and 18
males;mean age: 20.1; standard deviation of age: 2.12) participated voluntarily. Handedness
was assessed using an abridged version of the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). All
participants were Italian native speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and
were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment. All participants gave written informed
consent, and the experimental procedures were approved by the Ethic Committee of the
Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Italian National Research Council, Rome,
Italy (Approval number: 0000441).
Materials
We selected 90 Italian words from the Della Rosa et al. database (Della Rosa et al., 2010),
composed by 30 concrete words, 30 abstract and 30 emotional words. The selected words
were balanced in Familiarity (mean = 590; SD = 148.09). We considered as concrete words
the words that scored high on Concreteness (max. 700, min. 596; mean of Concreteness
= 660.42; mean of Abstractness = 138.87), and considered as abstract the words with
high Abstractness scores (max. 635, min. 375; mean of Abstractness = 535.24; mean
of Concreteness = 213.28). We considered as emotional words those words that had
intermediate scores of Abstractness and Concreteness (mean of Concreteness= 400; mean
of Abstractness = 372.74) and that according to the experimenters had high emotional
valence.
Because the emotional value was not present as a parameter in Della Rosa et al. (2010),
we performed an on-line pre-test in which 25 participants (13 females; mean of age =
30.6; SD= 14.5) judged the emotional value of each word on a 7-points Likert scale (1 was
rated as non-emotional and 7 as completely emotional). Since in the literature it is debated
whether emotional words can be considered as a subset of abstract concepts or represent
a kind of concept different from both concrete and abstract concepts (Altarriba, Bauer &
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Table 1 Characteristics of the three categories of words. A. Characteristics of the three selected categories of words in terms of psycholinguistic di-
mensions. B. Comparisons between the three selected categories of words in terms of psycholinguistic dimensions.
Category Concreteness Imageability Familiarity Age of
acquisition
Context
availability
Abstractness Modality of
acquisition
Number
of letters
Emotional
value
Frequency
(A)
Mean 232.28 261.37 441.27 469.27 357.96 530.64 566.43 9.25 2.90 70.25
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16Abstract
SD 35.59 70.18 57.45 65.23 59.05 60.75 62.60 2.79 .57 63.28
Mean 660.08 653.70 438.80 276.74 600.97 132.47 289.23 6.25 1.63 20.56
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16Concrete
SD 30.90 47.99 57.32 81.84 57.96 28.53 91.12 1.65 .18 15.40
Mean 321.49 346.32 438.57 395.73 436.12 446.51 483.73 8.13 5.20 82.69
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16Emotional
SD 31.54 50.12 75.30 66.83 59.57 34.14 74.25 2.19 .52 61.92
Mean 404.62 420.47 439.55 380.58 465.02 369.87 446.46 7.88 3.24 57.83
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48Total
SD 188.96 179.21 62.56 106.52 117.45 178.31 139.46 2.54 1.56 57.56
CATEGORY Concreteness Imageability Familiarity Age of
acquisition
Context
availability
Abstractness Modality of
acquisition
Number of
letters
Emotional
value
Frequency
(B)
Abstract-Concrete p< .001;
t (30)=−36.27;
SE = 11.79;
d = 12.82
p< .001;
t (30)=−18.4;
SE = 21.26;
d = 6.52
p= .9 p< .001;
t (30)= 7.3,
SE = 26.17;
d = 2.60
p< .001;
t (30)=−11.7;
SE = 20.69;
d = 4.15
p< .001;
t (30)= 23.7;
SE = 16.76;
d = 0.92
p< .001;
t (30)= 10.03;
SE = 27.64;
d = 3.54
p = .04;
t (30)= 3.60;
SE = 2.93;
d = 1.27
p< .001;
t (30)= 8.507;
SE = .149;
d = 3.068
p< .001;
t (30)= 3.05;
SE = 16.28;
d = 1.07
Abstract-Emotional p< .001;
t (30)=−7.49;
SE = 11.92;
d = 2.65
p< .001;
t (30)=−3.9;
SE = 21.54;
d = 1.39
p= .9 p= .004;
t (30)= 3.1;
SE = 23.35;
d = 1.11
p< .001;
t (30)=−3.7;
SE = 20.98;
d = 1.31
p< .001;
t (30)= 4.8;
SE = 17.40;
d = 1.70
p= .002;
t (30)= 3.4;
SE = 24.27;
d = 1.20
p= .2 p< .001;
t (30)=−11.933;
SE = .192;
d = 4.294
p= .4
Concrete-Emotional p< .001;
t (30)= 30.60;
SE = 11.06;
d = 10.82
p< .001;
t (30)= 17.7;
SE = 17.35;
d = 6.26
p= .9 p< .001;
t (30)=−4.4;
SE = 26.45;
d = 1.59
p< .001;
t (30)= 7.9;
SE = 20.79;
d = 2.80
p< .001;
t (30)=−28.2;
SE = 11.13;
d = 9.97
p< .001;
t (30)=−6.6;
SE = 29.37;
d = 2.34
p = .02;
t (30)=−2.32;
SE = 0.68;
d = 0.81
p< .001;
t (30)=−25.980;
SE = .137;
d = 9.391
p = .005;
t (30)=−3.89;
SE = 15.95;
d = 1.37
Benvenuto, 1999; Kousta et al., 2011), the pre-test also aimed at clearly distinguish abstract,
concrete and emotional words, to avoid overlaps between abstract and emotional words.
Among the original 90 words we selected 48 words: 16 more concrete, 16 more abstract
and 16 rated as more emotional. Characteristics of the three categories of selected words
in terms of dimensions and psycholinguistic variables are shown in Table 1(A).
We performed a T -Student test for independent samples by items and we calculated
the Effect size (Cohen’s d), in order to verify if concrete, abstract and emotional words we
chose differed in Concreteness, Abstractness and Emotional value.
All the categories (abstract, concrete and emotional words) resulted to differ in
Concreteness (ps < .001), Abstractness (ps < 001) and Emotional value (ps < .001).
Emotional words were rated as more emotional than both abstract and concrete words
(ps < .001); also abstract words were rated as more emotional than concrete words
(p< .001).
We also verified whether abstract, concrete and emotional words differed along a series
of dimensions that, according to different theories, are considered crucial to distinguish
concrete and abstract words, i.e., Imageability (IMG; Paivio, 1986), Age of Acquisition
(AoA; Gilhooly & Logie, 1980), Context Availability (CA; Schwanenflugel, Akin & Luh,
1992) and Modality of Acquisition (MoA; Wauters et al., 2003). We decided to avoid
controlling for these variables while selecting abstract and concrete words, because this
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would result in using a very reduced number of abstract and concrete concepts. More
crucially, it would lead us to use concepts that are weird and scarcely familiar. We instead
decided to select ‘‘good’’ abstract and concrete words: when compared to concrete words,
‘‘good’’ abstract words are typically less imageable (IMG), they are acquired later (AoA)
and mainly through language rather than through perceptual modalities (MoA), and they
are less associated to contexts (CA) (see e.g., Borghi et al., 2018b; C Villani, L Lugli, MT
Liuzza, AM Borghi, 2018, unpublished data).
The abstract, concrete and emotional words we selected thus differed not only in
Concreteness and Abstractness but also in Imageability, Age of Acquisition, Context
availability, and Modality of Acquisition.
As to psycholinguistic variables, we took care in balancing words for Familiarity, thus
the three categories didn’t differ on this dimension (all ps= .9).
The abstract and emotional words we selected were more frequent than concrete ones
(ps < .05). We chose highly frequent abstract words because we wanted to avoid stimuli
that were unfamiliar for participants which could have lead to abstractness driven effects.
Emotional and abstract words did not differ for frequency (p= .4).
Concrete words were also shorter than abstract and emotional words (ps < 04), while
emotional and abstract words did not differ (p= .2).
Results of the comparisons between the three categories of selected words in terms of
psycholinguistic variables and of all the relevant dimensions are shown in Table 1(B).
The effect of these variables on the results was determined through Generalized Linear
Mixed Models (GLMMs) performed on both experiments (1 and 2) and tasks (Lexical
Decision and Recognition) with accuracy and RTs as dependent variables. Together with
Type of Concept and Effector as main factors, we added Imageability, Age of Acquisition,
Contex Availability, Modality of Acquisition, Frequency and Number of Letters as covariates
(see ‘Results’ section).
To complete our stimuli we subsequently added 48 pseudowords, created by modifying
one letter at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of concrete, abstract and emotional
words in the same proportion as the critical words. Then we created 24 words to be used
as catch-trials: they were Italian words with a bold letter, at the beginning, in the middle
or at the end of the word. Finally, we selected 24 new words, maintaining the proportion
between abstract, concrete and emotional words for the recognition task. Words that can
directly activate hand or mouth (e.g., tools or food related words) were excluded from the
list. Stimuli are shown in Table 2.
The experiment consisted of two tasks, a lexical decision task and a recognition task,
that were presented in sequence; the lexical decision task always preceded the recognition
one. Two separate lists of words were created for the two tasks: for the lexical decision
task 24 critical words (8 concrete, 8 abstract, 8 emotional), and 24 pseudo-words. For the
recognition task list, 24 critical words (8 concrete, 8 abstract and 8 emotional) and 24 new
words were used.
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Table 2 Selected stimuli fromDella Rosa et al. (2010) database.
Italian word English word Frequency
value
Number of
letters
Frequency
mean
N. letters
mean
Affermazione Affirmation 59 12
Analogia Analogy 8 8
Circostanza Circumstance 70 11
Concetto Concept 118 8
Fascino Appeal 149 7
Funzione Function 185 8
Indiscrezione Indiscretion 16 13
Inefficienza Inefficiency 17 12
Inesperienza Inexperience 5 12
Insufficienza Insufficiency 15 13
Logica Logic 107 6
Merito Merit 141 6
Ozio Idleness 9 4
Reputazione Reputation 27 11
Tendenza Tendency 161 8
Unanimità Unanimity 37 8 Abstract = 70.3 9.25
Alghe Seaweed 24 5
Alveare Beehive 11 7
Canoa Canoe 25 5
Circo Circus 43 5
Cravatta Tie 38 8
Elefante Elephant 36 8
Falce Sickle 5 5
Flotta Fleet 35 6
Gallo Cock 12 5
Giraffa Giraffe 1 7
Minerale Mineral 9 8
Oca Goose 29 3
Palude Swamp 12 6
Telegrafo Telegraph 3 9
Torre Tower 44 5
Trattore Tractor 2 8 Concrete = 20.6 6.25
Abbandono Abandonment 91 9
Agitazione Agitation 25 10
Agonia Agony 29 6
Conflitto Conflict 140 9
Disperazione Desperation 101 12
Emergenza Emergency 161 9
Fallimento Failure 99 10
Fremito Trembling 11 7
Giuramento Vow 13 10
(continued on next page)
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Table 2 (continued)
Italian word English word Frequency
value
Number of
letters
Frequency
mean
N. letters
mean
Impulso Impulse 50 7
Ira Anger 45 3
Orrore Horror 77 6
Pericolo Danger 250 8
Stupore Wonder 62 7
Terrore Terror 96 7
Tradimento Betrayal 73 10 Emotional = 82.7 8.13
Procedure
Participants were tested individually, and were instructed to respond as quickly and
accurately as possible to each trial using a response box connected with a pedal and a
button (see Fig. 1A). They were given the instructions on the computer screen and were
trained at the beginning of every task. In no case further instruction from the experimenter
was needed; she only needed to specify how to use the button for the mouth responses,
and she made sure that participants used their dominant hand for hand’s responses.
Participants were not aware of the subsequent recognition task; during the instructions
they were just informed that they would complete an experiment composed by two phases.
Only the participant and the experimenter were present in the room; after the training
the experimenter sat outside the lab in order to avoid any kind of interference with the
experiment. Testing took place on a Pc (resolution: 1,024 × 768 pixel) running EPrime2
Professional software. Participants sat on a comfortable chair in front of a computer screen,
at a distance of about 60 cm.
Words appeared at the center of a computer screen at maximum 6.20◦ of visual angle.
Each trial began with a centred black fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by the presentation
of the word. Words remained on the screen for a time of maximum 1.5 s. After 1 s the next
trial started (see Fig. 1B).
Lexical decision task. The task was divided into two experimental blocks, each preceded
by a training block of 12 trials (6 words and 6 pseudo-words). Depending on the block,
participants kept the button to be pressed with their dominant hand or with the mouth.
The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. A set of 48 words was
presented on the computer screen (24 critical words, 24 pseudo-words). Participants were
asked to press the button with the hand or with the mouth, depending on the instructions,
if they read an Italian word, and to refrain from responding if the word they read was not
an Italian one.
Recognition task. The task was divided into two experimental blocks, each preceded by a
training block of 6 trials (3 words, 3 new words). Depending on the block, participants were
required to keep the button in their dominant hand or in the mouth, between the teeth.
A set of 48 words was presented in each block, composed by 24 critical words and 24 new
words. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Participants were
asked to press the button with the hand or with the mouth, depending on the condition,
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Figure 1 Procedure and devices used to respond to stimuli. (A) Mouth and hand buttons used to re-
spond to stimuli in Experiment 1, and to catch-trial in Experiment 2; pedal used to respond to stimuli in
Experiment 2. (B) Procedure: each trial began with a centred black fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by
the presentation of the word. Words remained on the screen for a time of maximum 1.5 s. After 1 s the
next trial started.
Full-size DOI: 10.7717/peerj.5987/fig-1
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in case they recognized the word on the screen as a word already presented in the previous
task, or to refrain from responding if they read a new word.
Results
The data were analyzed with Generalized linear mixed models (GLMM). Generalized linear
mixedmodels (GLMM) incorporate randomeffects into the linear predictor of a generalized
linear model (GLM). They include fixed linear predictor variables, within subject measures
and random variances to account for cluster-related correlations in the data. GLMMs
consider all the available data points, including those which occasionally failed on some
trials. Furthermore, GLMMs can handle non-normal outcome distributions, which is
important to account for accuracy, as it is likely to be highly skewed (Hedeker, 2005).
The effects of Type of Concept (abstract, concrete and emotional), of the Effector (mouth
vs. hand) and of their interaction were analyzed on the response times and on the accuracy
score (error) with two types of GLMMusing Frequency,Number of Letters, Imageability,Age
of Acquisition,Context Availability andModality of Acquisition as covariates.We introduced
these covariates to be sure that they did not affect our main results—for example, that
the differences we found in processing the kinds of concepts were not due to a linguistic
dimension or due to their different frequency.
In the first type of GLMM model, the response time was assumed to be normally
distributed, therefore the Identity link function was used, whereas in the second type of
model we adopted a logistic function because the accuracy was considered as having a
binomial distribution (presence/absence of error). The two types of models were applied
for the Lexical Decision and Recognition tasks of both Experiments 1 and 2.
Table 3 displays the GLMMs results in the different experiments showing the effect of
Type of Concept (abstract, concrete and emotional) and the Effector (mouth vs hand) and
their interaction as well as the covariates effect on the response time and accuracy.
Means of response times as a function of Type of Concept and Effector for both tasks
(Lexical Decision and Recognition) and experiments (1 and 2) are displayed in Table 4.
Lexical decision task. All erroneous trials (2.96%) were removed before the analysis of RTs.
In the lexical decision task, we found that the factor Type of Concept affected the response
time [Wald (2) = 11.04; p= .004]. Abstract concepts (mean: 738.59 ms, SE = 10062.11)
were responded to slower than emotional ones (mean: 697.27 ms, SE = 10058.79) and
concrete ones (mean: 685.18 ms, SE = 10048.57). The analysis also showed an advantage
for the hand (mean: 669.44 ms, SE = 10056.26) over the mouth effector (mean: 744.58
ms, SE = 10056.70) [Wald (1) = 77.43; p< .001].
All these effects are corrected for Frequency, Number of Letters, Imageability, Age of
Acquisition, Context Availability and Modality of Acquisition, however only Frequency
[Wald (1) = 33.84; p< .001; B = −.51], Number of Letters [Wald (1) = 69.04; p< .001;
B= 18.36] and Age of Acquisition [Wald (1) = 9.46; p= .002; B = .31] affected the time
of response in the lexical decision task. The predicted interaction between the two main
factors did not reach the significance.
The factor Type of Concept also affected the accuracy of responses [Wald (2) = 6.82;
p= .03]. The mean rates of errors corrected by the covariates were computed from the
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Table 3 GLMMs results of Experiments 1 and 2 of both lexical decision and recognition tasks.
Experiment 1
Lexical Decision task Recognition task
Effects RTs Accuracy RTs Accuracy
Intercept Wald(1)= 18.94; p< .001 Wald(1)= .35; p= .56 Wald(1)=23.8; p< .001 Wald(1)=15.1; p< .001
Type of Concept Wald(2)= 11.04; p= .004 Wald(2)=6.82; p= .03 Wald(1)= .95; p= .62 Wald(1)= 3.73; p= .15
Effector Wald (1)= 77.43; p< .001 Wald(1)= .12; p= .72 Wald(1)= 22.68; p< .001 Wald(1)= .54; p= .46
Type of Concept×Effector Wald(1)= .15; p= .92 Wald(1)= .38; p= .82 Wald(1)= 1.92; p= .38 Wald(2)= 7.17; p= .03
Number of Letters Wald(1)= 69.04; p< .001 Wald(1)=3.64; p= .06 Wald(1)= 25.17; p< .001 Wald(1)= 4.07; p= .04
Frequency Wald(1)= 33.84; p< .001 Wald(1)= 11.07; p< .001. Wald(1)= 2.31; p= .13 Wald(1)= 25.20; p< .001
Age of Acquisition Wald(1)= 9.47; p= .02 Wald(1)= 1.38; p= .24. Wald(1)= 2.77; p= .96 Wald(1)= .69; p= .41
Imageability Wald(1)= 1.98; p= .16 Wald(1)= .41; p= .52 Wald(1)= .65; p= .42 Wald(1)= 2.78; p= .10
Context Availability Wald(1)= .60; p= .44 Wald(1)= .76; p= .38 Wald(1)= .92; p= .34 Wald(1)= .55; p= .46
Modality of Acquisition Wald(1)= .23; p= .63 Wald(1)= 2.37; p= .12 Wald(1)= .102; p= .31 Wald(1)= 6.18; p= .013
Experiment 2
Intercept Wald(1)= 55.48; p< .001 Wald(1)= 6.04; p= .01 Wald(1)= 53.07; p< .001 Wald(1)= .74; p= .39
Type of Concept Wald(2)= 15.57; p< .001 Wald(1)=2 .69; p= .29 Wald(1)= 5.51; p= .06 Wald(1)= 3.50; p= .17
Effector Wald(1)= .69; p= .41 Wald(1)= 4.88; p= .027 Wald(1)= .64; p= .42 Wald(1)= 1.04; p= .31
Type of Concept×Effector Wald(1)= 77.43; p= .08 Wald(1)= 1.10; p= .57 Wald(2)= 7.72; p= .02 Wald(1)= 2.53; p= .28
Number of Letters Wald(1)= 33.68; p< .001 Wald(1)= .04; p= .84 Wald(1)= .24; p= .62 Wald(1)=1 42; p= .23
Frequency Wald(1)= 10.83; p= .001 Wald(1)= 3.32; p= .068 Wald(1)= .41; p= .52 Wald(1)= .88; p= .35
Age of Acquisition Wald(1)= 3.12; p= .078 Wald(1)= .22; p= .63 Wald(1)= 2.12; p= .15 Wald(1)= .24; p= .72
Imageability Wald(1)= 7.38; p< .007 Wald(1)= 4.24; p< .039 Wald(1)= 2.93; p= .09 Wald(1)= .78; p= .38
Context Availability Wald(1)= 1.50; p= .22 Wald(1)= 1.61; p= .20 Wald(1)= .001; p= .97 Wald(1)= .56; p= .45
Modality of Acquisition Wald(1)= 1.2569; p= .26 Wald(1)= .63; p= .43 Wald(1)= .009; p= .92 Wald(1)= .99; p= .32
Table 4 Means of response times as a function of Type of Concept and Effector for both tasks and experiments.
RTs of Lexical Decision Task 1,2 RTs of Recognition Task 1,2
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Effector Type of
concepts
M (RT ) SE M (RT ) SE M (RT ) SE M (RT ) SE
Abstract 776.44 ms 10062.12 875.74 ms 10707.76 751.96 ms 14406.93 875.61 ms 11412.84
Concrete 724.52 ms 10048.26 766.15 ms 10692.60 805.40 ms 14383.12 858.48 ms 11410.41Mouth
Emotional 732.79 ms 10058.45 839.33 ms 10704.21 774.65 ms 14400.25 891.49 ms 11410.57
Abstract 700.74 ms 10062.10 876.55 ms 10707.97 721.65 ms 14404.91 901.59 ms 11415.72
Concrete 645.83 ms 10048.90 777.19 ms 10692.41 750.50 ms 14384.32 852.80 ms 11413.15Hand
Emotional 661.76 ms 10059.14 804.56 ms 10703.91 705.84 ms 14398.77 844.32 ms 11412.07
logistic model for each effect. Mean rates of errors are reported in terms of percentage
of errors [abstract = 96%, SE = 13.15; concrete = 99%, SE = 4.87; emotional = 98%,
SE = 5.38]. All the effects are corrected for the abovementioned covariates, however only
Frequency [Wald (1) = 11.06; p= .001; B = .01] affected the accuracy of responses. No
other main effect or interaction reached the significance.
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Figure 2 Interaction between Type of Concept and Effector factors in response times of Recognition,
Experiment 1.
Full-size DOI: 10.7717/peerj.5987/fig-2
Recognition task. All erroneous trials (28.30%) were removed before the analysis of RTs. In
the analysis of response times, we found an advantage of the hand (mean: 726 ms, SE =
14405.92) over the mouth effector (mean: 777.34 ms, SE = 14396.75) [Wald (1) = 22.68;
p< .001]. All the effects were corrected using Frequency, Number of Letters, Imageability,
Age of Acquisition, Context Availability and Modality of Acquisition as covariates, however
only Number of Letters [Wald (1) = 25.17; p< .001; B= 13.60] affected the response time
in the recognition task. No other main effect or interaction reached the significance.
Nonetheless, a qualitative inspection of the interaction between the two main factors
Type of Concept and Effector revealed that the pattern was in trend with our hypothesis: the
advantage of the hand over the mouth responses was namely smallest with abstract words.
Emotional words were the most affected by the effector, showing 70 ms of advantage of
the hand over the mouth responses. They were followed by concrete words that showed a
facilitation of 50 ms of the hand over the mouth responses, while abstract words showed
the smallest advantage with the hand (30 ms of difference), as shown in Table 4 and Fig. 2.
In the analysis on the accuracy, the interaction between the two main factors Type
of Concept and Effector was significant [Wald (2) = 7.16; p= .02] (see Fig. 3). All the
effects are corrected for the abovementioned covariates, however only Number of Letters
[Wald (1) = 4.06; p= .04; B = −.05], Frequency [Wald (1) =25.20; p< .001; B = −.006]
and Modality of Acquisition [Wald (1) = 6.17; p= .01; B = −.003] resulted to affect the
accuracy. No other main effect reached the significance.
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Figure 3 Interaction between Type of Concept and Effector factors in the accuracy of Recognition
task, Experiment 1. The mean rate of errors were corrected by covariates included in the logistic model
(Frequency, Number of Letters, Imageability, Age of Acquisition, Context Availability and Modality of Acqui-
sition).
Full-size DOI: 10.7717/peerj.5987/fig-3
Discussion
The results show that in the lexical decision task abstract words were processed slower than
emotional words and in trend slower than concrete ones, confirming the well-established
concreteness effect (Paivio, 1986). In the lexical decision task, Frequency and Number of
Letters, together with Age of Acquisition appeared to be important variables, that may have
affected the results since in general the selected abstract words were longer and acquired
later. As to emotional words, their pattern seems to be similar to the pattern of concrete
words: in general, they yielded shorter response times than abstract words, and they seem
to be slightly advantaged in the hand condition.
Across the two tasks, responses with the mouth were slower than those with the hand,
independently from the concept kind; this effect is not worth discussing since it was likely
due to the fact that the button to hold among the teeth was harder to press than the key to
press with the hand (see also Borghi & Zarcone, 2016).
As to the activation of the hand and mouth effectors in relation to the different
type of concepts, in the lexical decision task we found no significant interaction. A
possible explanation is that effectors are differently activated only in tasks that require
a deeper processing level. The interaction between Type of Concept and Effector was
instead significant in the recognition task, in the analysis on accuracy, in which the general
disadvantage with the mouth effector was less pronounced with abstract words with respect
to concrete ones, while emotional words showed an advantage with the mouth effector.
It is worth noting that, beside Frequency and Number of Letters, Modality of Acquisition
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impacted significantly the results on accuracy of the recognition task. This could suggest
that, in a task requiring a deeper level of processing the way in which we acquire words is
more relevant than other psycholinguistic variables.
EXPERIMENT 2
A potential problem of Experiment 1 was that the device used to respond to critical trials
differed in the mouth and the hand conditions; this could explain why RTs were slower
with the mouth responses. Experiment 2 was designed to verify whether the findings
of Experiment 1 could be replicated also in an experiment in which the mouth and the
hand were not the direct response effectors, but were nonetheless occupied during the
task. We therefore introduced catch-trials, to which participants had to respond pressing
the button either with the hand or with the mouth. Participants were instead invited to
respond to critical trials by pressing a pedal with the foot, in order to avoid any potential
interference with the hand and mouth effectors. This change had the advantage to allow us
to manipulate the effector (hand vs. mouth) and at the same time to collect response times
and errors with the same device, i.e., the pedal.
In this experiment we intended to test whether abstract, concrete and emotional
concepts were differently activated when the mouth and the hand effectors were occupied.
We predicted a facilitation of the mouth responses with abstract concepts.
Method
Participants
Forty native Italian speakers in a range of age between 20–30 years (22 females and
18 males; mean of age: 23.5; standard deviation of age: 2.12) participated voluntarily.
Handedness was assessed using an abridged version of the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield,
1971). All participants were Italian native speakers, had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, and were naïve as to the purpose of the experiment. All participants gave written
informed consent, and the experimental procedures were approved by the CNR- ISTC
ethics committee.
Materials
Materials were the same as Experiment 1, except for 16 catch-trials that were added.
Catch-trials were Italian words with a bold letter.
As in Experiment 1, the experiment consisted of two tasks, a lexical decision task
and a recognition task, that were presented in sequence; the lexical decision task always
preceded the recognition one. Two separate lists of words were created for the two tasks:
for the lexical decision task 24 critical words (8 concrete, 8 abstract, 8 emotional) and 24
pseudo-words were used. For the recognition task list, the stimuli consisted of 24 critical
words (8 concrete, 8 abstract and 8 emotional) and of 24 new words.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as that of Experiment 1.
Lexical decision task. The task was divided into two experimental blocks, each preceded by
a training block of 16 trials (8 words and 8 catch-trials). A set of 64 words was presented
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on the computer screen (24 critical words, 24 pseudo- words and 16 catch-trials). The
words were arranged in two different lists, one for each block. Depending on the block,
participants were required to keep a button in their dominant hand or in the mouth,
between the teeth, and to respond to catch-trials by pressing it; they were instead asked to
press the pedal to respond to critical stimuli. The order of the blocks was counterbalanced
across participants. Participants were asked to press the pedal if they read an Italian word,
and to refrain from responding if the word they read was not an Italian one. They were
also required to respond to catch-trials by pressing the button with the hand or mouth,
depending on the condition. Hence the mouth and the hand were not the direct response
effectors, but depending on the condition either the mouth or the hand were occupied
during the execution of the task.
Recognition task. The task was divided into two experimental blocks, each preceded by a
training block of 8 trials (3 words, 3 new words and 2 catch-trials). A set of 62 words was
presented in each block, composed by 24 critical words, 24 new words and 12 catch-trials.
The order of the blocks was counterbalanced across participants. Depending on the block,
participants were required to keep the button in their dominant hand or in the mouth,
between the teeth. As to the critical stimuli, participants were asked to press the pedal
in case they recognized that the word on the screen had already been presented in the
previous task, or to refrain from responding if the read a new word. When catch-trials were
presented, they had to respond by pressing the button with the hand or mouth, depending
on the block.
Results
Lexical decision. All erroneous trials (4.58%) were removed before the analysis of RTs. In
the lexical decision task, the factor Type of Concept affected the response time [Wald (2)
= 15.56; p< .001], showing that abstract words (mean: 876.14 ms, SE = 10707.86) were
processed slower than both concrete (mean: 771.67 ms, SE = 10692.50) and emotional
words (mean: 821.95 ms, SE = 10704.06). All the effects are corrected using Frequency,
Number of Letters, Imageability, Age of Acquisition, Context Availability and Modality of
Acquisition as covariates, however only Frequency [Wald (1) = 10.82; p= .001; B = −.33],
Number of Letters [Wald (1) = 33.68; p< .001; B= 13.75] and Imageability [Wald (1) =
7.37; p= .007; B = .31] affected the response time. No other main effect or interaction
reached the significance.
In the analysis on accuracy, the hand condition elicited more errors than the mouth
condition. The mean rates of errors corrected by the covariates were computed from the
logistic model for each effect. Mean rates of errors are reported in terms of percentage
of errors (mouth: 95%, SE = 11.28; hand: 97%, SE = 7.09); (Effector [Wald (1) = 4.88;
p= .02]. All the effects are corrected for the linguistic dimension of the stimulus, however
only Imageability [Wald (1) = 4.24; p= .03; B = −.005] had an impact on the accuracy.
No other main effect or interaction reached the significance.
Recognition task. All erroneous trials (26.1%) were removed before the analysis of RTs.
In the analyses on response times, no main effect or effects of the covariates reached the
significance. However, the interaction between the two main factors Type of Concept and
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Figure 4 Interaction between Type of Concept and Effector factors in response times of Recognition
task, Experiment 2.
Full-size DOI: 10.7717/peerj.5987/fig-4
Effector was significant [Wald (2) = 7.72; p= .02] showing the predicted interaction:
abstract words were responded to faster with the mouth than with the hand, while concrete
and emotional words were responded faster with the hand than with themouth (see Table 4
and Fig. 4).
In the analysis on accuracy no main effect or interaction reached the significance, nor
did the effect of the covariates.
Discussion
Across the two tasks, abstract words were processed slower than both concrete and
emotional words. As in Experiment 1, our findings confirm the concreteness effect and
at the same time suggest that emotional words cannot be properly assimilated neither to
concrete nor to abstract words. In line with the results of Experiment 1, we did not find
a significant interaction between Type of Concept and Effector in the lexical decision task.
The effect of the covariates Frequency, Number of Letters and Imageability in the lexical
decision task, but not in the recognition task, suggests that these parameters could have
affected more incisively a relatively shallow task, especially in the speed of processing. In
the recognition task, instead, the interaction reached significance in the analysis of response
times. Abstract words yielded faster RTs when processed in the mouth condition, while
concrete and emotional words were responded to faster in the hand condition, as predicted
by the WAT (Words As social Tools) view.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
According to some proposals, abstract concepts evoke more linguistic experience than
concrete words (Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Borghi et al., 2018b; Dove, 2011; Gleitman et al.,
2005). If the involvement of language activates a motor simulation, this should result in a
higher engagement of the mouth effector in the processing of abstract words, compared
to that of concrete words. The main aim of this paper was to test the hypothesis that
different kinds of concepts, i.e., concrete, abstract and emotional ones, differently engaged
the mouth and hand effectors. In the two experiments we reported the mouth and the hand
effectors were involved either directly, to provide a response (Experiment 1), or indirectly,
keeping them occupied during the response (Experiment 2).
A further aim of this paper was related to the distinction between abstract, concrete
and emotional words. Since many authors consider emotional concepts as a subset of
abstract concepts while others tend to consider them as independent from both abstract
and concrete ones, we intended to verify whether the performance with emotional words
reflected that with abstract words or not.
Overall, our results confirmed the hypothesis that abstract words involve the activation
of the mouth, but the effect was modulated by the task and differed depending on whether
the response was provided directly using that effector or not. In the following we will point
out the main results, discussing them in light of the advanced hypotheses. We will first
illustrate results on the differences in processing the three concept kinds independently of
the effector, then we will focus on differences between concepts kinds in relation to the
activation of mouth and hand effectors.
Overall processing differences between concept kinds
Overall, abstract concepts were processed generally slower than concrete ones in the
lexical decision task (E1 and E2 lexical decision). Our results confirm the well-established
concreteness effect (Paivio, 1986; but see exceptions to the effect when controlling stimuli
for valence: Kousta et al., 2011; Barca, Burani & Arduino, 2002), that shows that abstract
words are slower than concrete ones, and extended it showing that in the lexical decision
task they are also slower than emotional words (see also Ponari, Norbury & Vigliocco, 2017).
Interestingly, however, such effect reached significance only in the lexical decision task.
As to emotional words, our results cast doubts on the assimilation of emotional to
abstract concepts: across experiments and tasks, the pattern of responses elicited by
emotional words differed from that of abstract words and occasionally from that of
concrete words too. In the lexical decision task of both experiments emotional words were
processed faster than abstract words and did not significantly differ from concrete words.
Our results are in line with those of a study by Siakaluk et al. (2016) showing that valenced
words were processed faster than other words in lexical decision task. Overall, emotional
words differed in processing from both concrete and abstract concepts, confirming the
views according to which they represent a third kind of concept (Altarriba, Bauer &
Benvenuto, 1999; Setti & Caramelli, 2005).
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Processing differences between concept kinds in relation to the
effectors
The experiments we designed were driven from the hypothesis that abstract concepts would
activate more the mouth motor system. Furthermore, we wanted to explore whether the
two effectors, mouth and hand, would be differently activated with emotional words. We
thus expected to find a Type of Concept x Effector interaction.
If we consider lexical decision, in neither experiment was the predicted Type of Concept x
Effector interaction significant. Results thus seemed to suggest that the lexical decision task
did not lead to a differential activation of the hand and mouth effectors depending on the
concept kind, likely because of the superficial processing level it implied. This interpretation
is supported by the fact that in the lexical decision task typical psycholinguistic variables
such as Frequency and Number of Letters resulted to impact the speed of responses in both
Experiments and also the accuracy in Experiment 1.
The results consistently differed if we consider the Recognition task. In Experiment 1
the interaction reached significance in accuracy and was present in trend in RTs, while
in Experiment 2 the interaction was significant in RTs. In Experiment 1, the general
disadvantage caused by the mouth device was smaller for abstract words with respect to
concrete words in both the accuracy and the response times. In Experiment 2, in which
the hand and mouth were occupied but responses were provided in the same manner,
namely pressing a pedal with the foot, responses to abstract words were faster in the mouth
than in the hand condition, while the opposite was true for both concrete and emotional
words. These results clearly confirm our hypothesis, indicating that abstract words were
facilitated when the mouth was activated, and extend previous results, showing that such
a facilitation occurred not only when the mouth was the direct response effector but also
when the mouth was occupied with a device.
This confirms the predictions of the WAT proposal, according to which abstract
concepts re-enact linguistic and social experience more than concrete concepts, hence
determining a higher activation of the mouth. Three possible mechanisms can underline
this activation (see for further discussion Borghi & Zarcone, 2016; Borghi et al., 2018b): (a)
the re-enactment of the acquisition experience, which is mainly linguistic and occurs in
a social context; (b) the inner speech used to re-explain to us the meaning of abstract
concepts; (c) the meta-cognitive awareness that our conceptual knowledge is inadequate
followed by the motor preparation to ask to others information on words meaning (social-
metacognition, Borghi et al., 2018b). The present study does not allow us to determine
which of the three mechanisms is responsible of the effects; further research is needed in
order to disentangle them.
The pattern of results of emotional concepts was also rather consistent across the two
experiments, and clearly different from that of abstract concepts. In the recognition task of
both Experiments 1 and 2, emotional words were processed slightly slower in the mouth
than in the hand condition, differently from abstract words. Finally, the fact that abstract
but not emotional words selectively engage only the mouth effector is in keeping with
recent experimental results. Ratings results showed that emotional concepts activate both
the mouth and the hand effectors, while mental states concepts activate more selectively
Mazzuca et al. (2018), PeerJ, DOI 10.7717/peerj.5987 19/26
the mouth (Ghio, Vaghi & Tettamanti, 2013). fMRI results clearly demonstrated that while
the face/mouth motor system in the brain is more activated by ‘‘pure’’ abstract concepts as
mental state concepts than by emotional ones, which activate hand and face motor cortex
to similar degrees (Dreyer & Pulvermüller, 2018). Overall, this finding is in line with views
according to which no strict dichotomy between abstract and concrete concepts exists. Our
results rather suggest that emotional concepts cannot be assimilated neither to concrete nor
to abstract concepts, (see Barca, Mazzuca & Borghi, 2017; Mazzuca, Barca & Borghi, 2017,
for further discussion), and are in line with the proposal according to which emotional
concepts, being more grounded than other abstract concepts, provide a bootstrapping
mechanism to learn them (Ponari, Norbury & Vigliocco, 2017).
While we found that abstract concepts processing was facilitated with the mouth, the
results are less marked than in a previous study (Borghi & Zarcone, 2016). We ascribe this
difference to two factors: first, to the fact that in the previous study participants were
provided with a context and not only with single words, and second, to the fact that the
task was a deep processing one.
It can be objected that effectors effects have previously been found with lexical decision
tasks. However, it is difficult to directly compare our results with those of previous
studies with lexical decision, such as those by Pulvermüller (2005) and Neininger &
Pulvermüller (2003), because these studies employed as stimuli action words directly related
to the effectors (Pulvermüller, 2005) and strongly perceptual related words (Neininger &
Pulvermüller, 2003).
Even if we did not find the predicted interaction with effectors, our findings are in
line with those of previous lexical decision studies with concrete and abstract words. For
example, Dreyer et al. (2015) comparing abstract emotional words with tool, food, animal
words and effector related words, showed that in the control group abstract-emotional
words yielded longer RTs than food and animal related words, while there was no difference
in the accuracy. Moreover, in the same study (always in the control group), Dreyer et al.
found that hand-related verbs were processed faster than verbs related to face and leg. Our
results on lexical decision are in line with the evidence reported, showing a concreteness
effect and a general advantage of responses given with the hand.
In sum, the present study adds important information to previous studies on concepts
and effectors activation: it suggests that the mouth and hand effectors can be differently
activated depending on the task and on the depth level it implies. The different effectors did
not influence results in the lexical decision task, but they had an impact on a subsequent
recognition task.
CONCLUSION
Overall, our studies show that, in general, abstract words are more difficult to process than
concrete ones, as revealed by the slower RTs, independently from the task. This confirms
the concreteness effect, well-established in the literature. Furthermore, the pattern of
results obtained with emotional words suggests that they are markedly different from both
concrete and abstract concepts.
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If we consider the relationship between concepts and effectors, we confirmed the
hypothesis proposed by the WAT theory that abstract concepts had an advantage in the
mouth condition. The result was howevermodulated by the task: the effectors did not have a
different effect on concepts in a lexical decision task, but impacted a subsequent recognition
task. Overall, our findings highlight that concepts are grounded and activate bodily
experiences, but they also point out the exquisitely flexible character of our conceptual
representation.
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